Literature and Psychology

THE QUARTERLY NEWS LETTER OF GENERAL TOPICS 10 OF THE MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION

Editorial address:

Department of English
Mott Hall, The City College
New York 31, N. Y.

Leonard F. Manheim, Editor
Eleanor B. Manheim, Associate

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Volume IX Winter 1959 No. 1

Je sçay bien que fort peu de gens rechigneront à la license de mes escrits, qui n'ayent plus à rechigner à la license de leur pensée. Je me conforme bien à leur courage, mais j'offence leurs yeux.... "Non pudeat dicere quod non pudeat sentire." ...

Au reste, je me suis ordonné d'oser dire tout ce que j'ose faire, et me desplais des pensées mesmes impubliables. Le pire de mes actions et conditions ne me semble pas si laide comme je trouve laid et lâche de ne l'oser avouer.... Qui s'obligeroit à tout dire, s'obligeroit à ne rien faire de ce qu'on est contraint de taire.... Il faut voir son vice et l'estudier pour le redire. Ceux qui le celent à autruy, le celent ordinairement à eux mesmes.... "Quare vitia sua nemo confitetur? Quia etiam nunc in illis est; somnium narrare vigilantis est." [Seneca, Letters, LIII]

— Montaigne. Essais
Livre III, Chapitre V
(Suggested by W. J. G.)

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"Disarming and Uncanny Visions: Freud's 'The Uncanny' with Regard to Form and Content in Stories by Sherwood Anderson and D. H. Lawrence,"
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With this contribution we welcome to our pages an author from whom we hope to hear much in the future. Dr. Hepburn's present paper is a departure from his subject of major interest, a critical study of Arnold Bennett on which he is now working. With a B. A. from Yale, Dr. Hepburn took his advanced degrees from the University of Pennsylvania. He is now on the faculty of the English Department at Cornell.

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ANNOUNCEMENTS, COMMENTS, AND CORRESPONDENCE

** Some readers did not get beyond the first line of the first announcement in the last issue. LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY, with the blessing of G. T. 10, is continuing unchanged except for an alteration in its masthead and such future modifications and innovations as good advice, attractive contributions, and financial improvements may produce.

** Your Editors are asked from time to time whether they have well and truly explored all the possibilities for financial aid or underwriting for this journal. Perhaps some excerpts from letters received from a Foundation which shall be nameless will explain the creaking pace at which such matters are transacted:

November 14, 1956

Dear Mr. Manheim:

Your letter of October twenty-eighth and the issues of Literature and Psychology which you sent this Foundation have been received. I am writing to let you know that your request for assistance to this publication will be brought to the attention of the Board of Trustees at an early date. If it is felt that the Foundation might be able to contribute in some way to the support of this endeavor, we shall be in touch with you in order to obtain more detailed information with respect to your financial needs. In any case, you will be hearing from us shortly.

There followed several telephone calls and an inconclusive interview. Then —

December 19, 1958

Dear Mr. Manheim:

The Trustees of this Foundation have once again given consideration to your request for assistance. . . .

I have been requested by the Trustees to express to you their regret that they are n o t in position to offer any support to this publication. The present program of the Foundation does n o t include the granting of assistance to journals. . . .

The Trustees have asked me to tell you that they a r e sorry it has taken so long to reach a decision in this matter and to express to you their hope that you have been successful in obtaining elsewhere the funds needed to assist this publication.

We have n o t been successful. Are there any further suggestions?

** Our readers will, we are sure, be most interested in a letter received from Miss Maud Bodkin:

Dec 27

Dear Mr. Manheim

Thank you very much for sending me the copies of Literature and Psychology, summer and fall issues. I have been very interested in trying to understand something of the intention and outlook of the University Colleges that are developing new contacts between literature and psychology, & have given so generous a welcome to my work in this field.

As one whose first approach to the subject occurred so long ago as to be mediated by such older psychologists & philosophers as Wm. James, F. H. Bradley, G. F. Stout, I have been anxious that those concerned with the new developments should not altogether ignore the insights contained in the older works. One attraction for me in Jung's ideas of archetypal images to be studied in literature, & of a 'collective unconscious' — a term akin to the 'Great Memory' of Yeats — is that it invites to further study of that same literary heritage which the older philosophers have so long deeply valued & studied.

Now that I cannot but regret that failing energies prevent my continuing, as I should wish, work along these lines, it is a consolation that the books in which I have tried to illustrate these ideas should be recognized by younger thinkers whose work has other influences. . . .

With all good wishes for your work in the coming years.

Yours sincerely

Maud Bodkin

** Your Editor, as chairman of next year's Group meeting, has received suggestions and offerings of papers for the 1959 program. It might be well to announce a policy here. All other things being equal, preference will be given to papers which can be pre-published in the Fall issue. In that way they can be considered, along with other contributions, by the editorial committee, which will then select for that issue papers of appropriate length which are especially suitable for oral presentation and discussion.

** While we are on the subject of the editorial committee, our readers may be interested in knowing that we have obtained agreement from experts in various specialized fields of literature to read and pass on papers submitted. For the present, the anonymity of these readers will be preserved in order to save them from possible embarrassment, especially in the light of the fact that we always attempt to return mss. which we cannot use with as full a set of critical comments as possible.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH LITERATURE NEWSLETTER

To be issued quarterly beginning April 1959

Joan Corbett, editor
Box 248
University of Richmond
Richmond 21, Virginia

You are invited to contribute articles and book reviews of literature pertaining to the British Dominions.

MINUTES OF THE 1958 MEETING

The first annual meeting of Discussion Group General Topics 10 (constituting the ninth annual meeting for the discussion of Literature and Psychology) was held in the Hartford Room of the Hotel Statler in New York City on Sunday, December 28, 1958, at 9:15 a. m. Attendance reached a maximum of over 130 before adjournment. Professor Wayne Burns was chairman. The business meeting opened with the reading of the report of the Advisory and Nominating Committee by the secretary, on behalf of Professor Leon Edel, chairman of the committee. The report recommended the continuance of the present Advisory and Nominating Committee, with the addition of the outgoing Group chairman as chairman of that committee for the ensuing year; the continuance of the present Editorial and Program Committee, and the nominations of Dr. Manheim as chairman and Professor William J. Griffin as secretary for 1959. There being no further nominations from the floor, motion was made and carried that the nominations be closed and those nominated be declared elected. It was also moved without dissent that the publication of LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY be continued under the auspices of the Discussion Group in substantially its present form.

The chairman then introduced the first speaker, Professor Joseph Prescott of Wayne State University, whose paper was summarized by the author for this issue of LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY as follows:

THE CHARACTERIZATION OF LEOPOLD BLOOM [1]

I

As the paper which I am about to read represents a chapter of a longer study, I should like to make a few introductory and, later, a few concluding remarks about the place of this chapter within the study as a whole.

Herbert Gorman's biography of James Joyce, containing valuable information and documents, Stuart Gilbert's analysis of the published text of Ulysses, Frank Budgen's record of Joyce's conversation and correspondence during the composition of Ulysses, and the writings of others have greatly increased our understanding and enjoyment of the novel. No one, however, has yet analyzed the materials of Ulysses as they were going through the creative process in Joyce's now widely scattered manuscripts, typescripts, proof sheets, and other preliminary drafts.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the technique of Ulysses as it is revealed by the growth of the text through the innumerable, extensive, and significant changes which the author made in various stages of the writing of the book. The revisions constitute an enormous body of material which yields much new light on Joyce's intentions and methods.

The present study takes account of such things as the manuscript notebooks and sheets in the University of Buffalo Library, the manuscript of Ulysses in the Rosenbach Foundation, a certain number of the scattered typescript sheets, the partial and untrustworthy serial version in the Little Review, a large collection of proof sheets in the Harvard Library, and other documents in private hands. The fact that the proofs in the Harvard Library alone offer from one to eight galleys for any given segment of Ulysses should indicate how the materials afford a fascinating insight into Joyce's methods as well as a basis for observations on the entire history of the novel.

This paper is chiefly a somewhat abbreviated version of a selection from the second or four chapters on characterization, the first dealing with Stephen Dedalus [2], the third with minor characters, and the fourth with Molly Bloom.

II

Unlike the shape of Stephen Dedalus, who, coming over from A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, had, as Joyce said, a shape that could not be changed, the shape of Bloom, during the composition of Ulysses, had yet to be molded and perfected. As a consequence, the revisions relating to this character are especially numerous.

Joyce's recorded conversations encourage one to believe that he started with large and fluid concepts which he then proceeded to particularize by concrete, detailed illustration. The reader's experience, however, is inductive, and only after building up the character bit by bit can he perceive the pattern of the whole. More importantly, working through the revisions, he begins at a stage that is inductive for both author and reader, the author introducing details, the reader following the author, both building toward the whole, the first from preconceived outlines, the second toward outlines that are yet to be apprehended. Painstakingly, indefatigably, Joyce linked together the innumerable atoms that finally emerge as Leopold Bloom. With the benefit of hindsight the reader of the published text may fluently formulate Bloom as a product of this, of

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1/ The writing of this paper was made possible, in part, by a sabbatical leave of absence from Wayne State University and a grant from the Committee on Research Activities of the Modern Language Association of America.

2/ This chapter is to appear, under the title "The Characterization of Stephen Dedalus in Ulysses," in Letterature Moderne. A summary of another chapter will appear, under the title "Stylistic Realism in Joyce's Ulysses," in the volume of acts (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitatsverlag) of the triennial congress of the International Federation for Modern Languages and Literatures held in Heidelberg in 1957; the full text, in A James Joyce Miscellany: Second Series, ed. Marvin Magalaner (Carbondale, Illinois; Southern Illinois University Press).

that, and of other forces; the process of creation, however, is recaptured only when he retraces the steps which Joyce took in shaping the man.

To appreciate Bloom fully, one must take into account, among other things, his religious origins. The baptized son of a Hungarian Jew, Bloom stands between two cultures, neither of which he can accept, by neither of which he is accepted. His thought and his feeling, consequently, are shot through with the disturbing awareness that he is everywhere neither fish nor fowl; and the attitude of his fellow-Dubliners toward him bears him out. (Specimen revisions follow.)

Although some general observations have been made in Joycean criticism about Bloom as the stranger in a strange land, the specifically Jewish content of his mind has still to be examined fully. Yet Bloom has revealing memories of his Jewish origins. Again and again fragments drift to the surface of his thought, with a persistence that is significant of their importance in his divided mentality. (Specimens from final text follow.) In the process of revision Joyce augments the Jewish content of Bloom's mind with steady purpose. (Specimen revisions follow.)

The memories which I have thus far cited are summoned up in fairly clear outline. But there is an even more interesting aspect of Bloom's mind, an aspect which speaks for the insight of his creator. For Joyce did more than endow Bloom with his Jewish memories. Bloom, it will be noted, was born a year after his father's conversion to Christianity. The information regarding cultural antecedents which such a child would come by, would very likely be confused and often wide of the mark. Bloom's inaccuracies confirm the hypothesis. In revising, Joyce now and then impairs Bloom's memories. (Specimen revisions follow.) On occasion, Joyce himself errs. (Specimen passages follow.)

It is worth noting that Bloom's overt references to Judaism occur only under extraordinary circumstances, in the heat of retaliation, under the relaxed censorship of a fatigued mind and a paternal impulse. Otherwise his awareness of difference, at its strongest in his Jewish thoughts, is wrapped in protective silence.

The revisions with regard to Bloom are more than enough to demonstrate the groundlessness with which some critics have denied authenticity to this character, for Joyce realized with unparalleled fullness and immediacy his intention to present, as he stated, a "'complete all-round character.'"

III

Joyce's revisions represent almost exclusively a process of elaboration. Great numbers of additions gravitate into patterned constellations of purpose and method, and innumerable details, in the final text as well as in the additions, become luminous with meaning.

In improving upon his characters, Joyce evinces a hundred-eyed alertness to the possibilities of fuller and more immediate realization.

Having created Leopold Bloom, the central character of Ulysses, specifically for this novel, Joyce devotes a major portion of his revising effort to making complete to the last detail an extraordinarily vivid portrait of the average man. He amplifies, not only upon Bloom's position as alien, but also upon his physique; his caution; his interest in science; his private thought; his curiosity, inventiveness, and didacticism; his triteness; his disparaging view of humanity and his humanitarianism; his inaccuracy; his commercialism; his sexual experience. Throughout this process, Joyce has minute regard to the living continuity and consistency of his character.

Briefly, the revisions afford a direct view into the mind of Joyce in the process of creation. This insight, fascinating in itself as an adventure in psychological analysis, yields two contributions of critical importance. By making us aware of fresh and dominant relationships, it enables us to effect a fuller synthesis in our apprehension of the finished work of art. By making clearer the kinship of that work with Joyce's earlier and later works, it enables us to appraise more justly Joyce's total achievement.

The chairman then introduced Professor Paul C. Obler, who presented orally the paper "Psychology and Literary Criticism: A Summary and Critique" which was pre-published in this journal (VIII, 4, 50-59). Professor Obler announced his intention of presenting the material in that paper in condensed form, but omitting no substantial part thereof. The discussion which followed was therefore based on the paper both as presented orally and as pre-printed. The first discussion leader, Professor Martin Kallich of Northern Illinois University, has contributed the following summary of his remarks:

Mr. Obler's clear summary of the various psychological approaches to criticism is a useful synthesis. It will be of great help — like Louis Fraiberg's thesis — to those who wish to see the tremendous potential that modern psychology can offer criticism. As I was reading the essay before this meeting, it occurred to me that my contribution here can best be made by indicating what I believe to be significant omissions from Obler's description of the present state of psychological criticism, his synthesis being similar to that presented by Wellek and Warren, and by Wimsatt and Brooks in their respective works.

Surprisingly enough, a really neglected area of synthetic research — one ignored by Obler — is biography. Garraty's recent book on the history and the problems of biography is helpful, as it places the psychoanalytic approach to biography in historical perspective, and as it also describes several psychological methods used by biographers when coping with the problem of personality, but Garraty's treatment is necessarily brief, and although rich in ideas, only suggestive. /1

1/ John A. Garraty, The Nature of Biography (New York: Knopf, 1957). See L&P, VII,4, 61.

What is needed, then, is a comprehensive, analytic and evaluative history of the impact of psychology — particularly of depth psychology — on modern biography from the turn of the century to the present. So far as I know, such an informative work has yet to be done: a history that would focus on psychology in biography. Such a history ought to present the facts and to attempt evaluation.

Moreover, because of Garraty's own background as a historian, critical and literary implications tend to be ignored in his book. (Incidentally, Frederick Hoffman's Freudianism and the Literary Mind does not include a discussion of biography.) The critical and literary implications of psychoanalytic biography are discussed by Leon Edel in one of his lectures on Literary Biography.

Indirectly, Professor Edel has demonstrated the possibility of an evaluative criticism based upon an interpretation supplied by a knowledge of psychoanalysis. He has shown how the tools of psychoanalysis, applied to Willa Cather's life and then to her fiction The Professor's House, illuminate the novel's symbolism and set the basis for a correct critical evaluation of its structural unity. Edel makes the point that the universal symbolism of psychoanalysis is much too general and remote to explain by itself the unity and effectiveness of the fictional work. Edel then correlates analysis of the novel with an analysis of particular events in Willa Cather's life; and arriving at what he believes to be a more accurate and useful explanation, he is able to assess the novel as novel. Thus we may say the biographer has united the qualities of critic and psychoanalyst: "By penetrating more deeply into the life it has been possible to penetrate more deeply into the work." /2

Such is one achievement of psychoanalytic criticism — a kind of criticism that involves not only a motivational study of personality in fiction and in life but also an assessment of formal value — in short, normative criticism. Such a possibility is generally denied to psychological critics, who are thought by academic purists like Wimsatt and Brooks to operate in a sphere essentially extrinsic to "true" literature and criticism.

It is said that the marriage of literature and psychology can produce only descriptive but never prescriptive or evaluative criticism. Must this necessarily be so? Why cannot knowledge of psychology also be used normatively as a measure for assessing the structural unity as well as the development of fictional personality in depth? Such knowledge can permit the critic to evaluate achievement in characterization — failures or successes in plausible, consistent, and truthful insight into characterological problems can be noted. Certainly, in our time any writer of mature fiction who knows little about modern psychology will in his faulty art betray his ignorance.

According to Wellek and Warren (Theory of Literature) — and Obler, too —, the psychological study of literature embodies the following areas:

1. the study of the writer, as type and individual,
2. the study of the creative process (genetic fallacy),
3. the study of the psychological types and laws present within works of literature,

and

4. the effects of literature upon its readers (audience psychology).

Wellek and Warren believe that only the third belongs, in the strictest and purest sense, to literary study. If this is so, then here by their own admission we may find evaluative and formal possibilities for psychological criticism. /3 Thus it would be incorrect and illogical to consider psychology "extrinsic" to a consideration of literature. What we need to demonstrate, then, is that violations of psychological truths in any particular instance do or do not affect aesthetic value. Further — what we need is an elaborate discussion of this idea (a historical resumé) so that it can be seen in the round and in depth. The critical theory of the rigorous formalists can then be seen for what it truly is — facile or inconsistent.

What is needed is a useful synthesis of the field — a comprehensive survey of the contributions that psychoanalytic knowledge has already made in general to all literature — to supplement Hoffman's work — or, in particular, to the literary genres. Such studies, as they enable us to see what has been done, will point to more precise and refined analytic studies of particular works that must be made in the future. What we need, in short, is summing up, evaluation, and recapitulation — historical studies of the ideas of various analytic psychologies on all literature, including biography. Such historical essays, if they are to be exact, should also take into consideration the changes in the stages of Freud's thought from decade to decade, as well as the differences between Freud and his disciples and other analysts who have modified Freud's views and developed theories of their own. Thus we can be accurate in historical criticism and in the history of ideas when we deal with genetic influences.

2/ Leon Edel, Literary Biography (Univ. of Toronto Press, 1957), p. 80. The essay on The Professor's House was first published in L&P, IV, 5, 69-79.

3/ They do admit, for example, that psychology has enlarged our views of the traditional rhetoric, especially in the use of symbol and myth. But they do not permit psychology to perform an evaluative function.

The second discussion leader, Professor William Wasserstrom of the University of Rochester, has entitled his commentary

BLANDISHMENTS, MORAL AND IMMORAL

For two reasons my remarks on Professor Obler's paper are composed in a formal way, to be read, not simply uttered at random. First, I'm not very good at ad lib; second, I conceive my duty on this occasion to require neither a detailed analysis of Mr. Obler's whole argument nor a full statement of all attitudes possible in reaction to his

paper. Rather, I undertake to establish some measure of coherence by saying what is, to my mind, the leading issue raised in this essay and by proposing which modes of response are most fertile for the conversation which must now occur. I shall not, therefore, make a segment-by-segment analysis, but shall speak about the drift of thought inherent in the essay as a whole.

First, we must thank Professor Obler for having taken on a task which is in itself awesome — for having tried to describe the chief problems and accomplishments in psychology and criticism, from the beginnings till now. He ought to be complimented for bravery too, for his willingness to expose himself to the kind of inquiry that invariably occurs whenever a group of highly trained and serious and articulate people meet in formal session. His courage is the more notable in that he sets himself the task of confronting matters which, as surely we must agree, are among the most troublesome and the most fascinating in the whole field of contemporary criticism and scholarship. We recognize, therefore, whatever else must also be said, that Professor Obler has tried very earnestly and ambitiously to make a synthesis of the kind we all require; to make, as he says, a summary and a critique.

But I wonder if he ought to have tried to accomplish in an article what no one has yet felt strong enough to make into a book. Perhaps he plans to use this essay as a scenario for a larger work. If this is true, then our remarks may help to shape that larger work in ways that are more profitable than those indicated in the current essay itself. The idea of a scenario is suggested by the quite specific scheme which has been invented in order to account for all the issues inherent in this area of study. He treats, as you know, the psychology of the artist, the psychology of the audience, the connections between the psychology of art and the psychology of the artist, the opinions of the formalist-critics. The sections are not all of equal worth. Simon O. Lesser, for example, may feel that any essay which disregards his work on the appeals of fiction and credits I. A. Richards' only — Mr. Lesser can argue that this section of Professor Obler's paper is hardly up to the mark.

You are aware, I'm certain, that my objection here concerns neither holes in bibliography nor Obler's reliance on a fairly modest number of mentors — though there are holes and we d o sense the hovering shade of Stanley Edgar Hyman. But far more important than some oversights of this kind is the thesis of the argument we are asked to admire. For I think there is an argument in an essay that presents itself as an historical survey and general s u m m i n g up. Abstracted, the argument says that the Freudian system and the Freudian critic display the poet as a daydreamer whose regressions, whose neurosis, constitute the main subject of psychoanalytic inquiry. The Jungian system, and the Jungian critic, however, are said to restore to the poet his proper dignity and to establish him in his proper role as a seer, a prophet whose work is steeped in the primordial stuff of life.

This is the reason why the section on Freud begins with the quotation from Plato about the poet's nature, about the divinity of his madness. And it is this quotation that sets the tone for the discussion of Freudian criticism that follows — in which, unfortunately, we hear all the cliches: reductionism; the Freudian's preference for speculation about the poet's psyche, his habitual disregard of the poem. The burden of this argument rests on Freud's initial perceptions, on the 1910 essay by Jones — and making the date 1949 simply won't do — on the earliest notions of Rank, Wittels and the rest; on some early work by Krutch, Van Wyck Brooks, and a few others. It is, however, nineteen years since Trilling's important essay appeared; it is twenty-three years since Mann's famed address; it is thirty years since Wilson's studies were published. These are the years when a whole generation of psychiatrists and psychologists — Kris, Alexander, Rosenzweig, Kanzer — have displayed the uses of tact in the study of the text. In this section of Professor Obler's paper, therefore, a point of departure is presented as if it were the moment of revealed truth.

Even more extraordinary is Professor Obler's decision to reserve for the end of the section on Jung the best remark in his essay. There we read that psychology, literature, and criticism blend once we recognize man as a symbol-making and symbol-using animal. I'm puzzled trying to understand how the discussion of Jung could have provoked this conclusion, particularly when Burke's miraculous though often muddy work is cited as testimony. Burke is little interested in Jung, so far as I can tell. And Miss Langer, whose words on symbolism Professor Obler echoes; Ernst Cassirer, Northrop Frye, and even Caroline Spurgeon — indeed, all those who concern themselves most elaborately with language, that area really seminal for criticism in our time — these people and this concern exist almost precisely because of Freud's description of the unconscious and its symbolic language. /1 Professor Obler's disregard of this fact, his decision not to say more than a word about language itself, are serious lapses. For this decision forces him to overlook the psychoanalytic stimulus to Empson's achievement, to scant Burke's whole effort to compose a field theory of imagination — a theory based on language alone — and to mistake the chief meaning of Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism. What emerges is a distortion of the very climate of contemporary thought and, in consequence, Professor Obler's work as an historian of ideas is less reliable than we had hoped it would be.

Indeed, the treatment of Frye illustrates both this distortion and that other matter mentioned earlier, the argument inherent in the essay. For Obler is convinced that Jung ought to be very highly prized, that we have tended to misunderstand or to demean Jung's

1/ At the M L A meeting, Professor Leon Edel remarked that the study of language should be supplemented by what he called the study of "voice" — a given writer's peculiar mode of d i s c o u r s e. If we understand "voice" to encompass style, we can imagine how a wholly informed theory of criticism may exploit the interplay among language, voice, and form.

best ideas. And he offers as evidence Frye's respect for and use of the concept of the archetype. Respect and use are undeniable: Frye borrows ideas and shows analogies whatever the source and wherever these seem apt. But to argue that he's a Jungian — to take his remark as evidence that we must revise our opinion of Jung — is no more accurate than to say that he or, for example, Empson, is a Freudian. Frye notes that Jung and his school account for the communicability of archetypes by a "theory of the collective unconscious" and this, he very blandly continues, is "an unnecessary hypothesis in literary criticism."

It is, however, precisely on this concept of the collective unconscious that Professor Obler bases his plea for a renewed attention to Jung's work: the heart of Jung's theory composes the very center of Obler's thought. And he remarks that the critic who "makes use of the concept" will understand how a writer dips into the "collective unconscious where he discovers shape and structure with which to order the chaotic images of his own dream world." In Obler's view, this concept helps to esatblish Jung's importance for literature and criticism, helps to re-establish in us a clearer sense of the artist's dignity, and enables us to return from our Freudian fixation on the idea of neurosis and turn instead to the poem itself.

I submit that it does no such thing; that, on the contrary, it removes us from the work and distracts us because it demands that we believe that Faust created Goethe and not Goethe, Faust. It asks us to accept and, in our activity as critics. to explore a kind of astrology of the spirit. We are presented with a chimera which Professor Obler is quite willing to have us chase down. For the truth or falsehood of the collective unconscious, its worth as a hypothesis, in his mind are deemed irrelevant. The mere fact that the notion has charm is merit enough to warrant "careful consideration for use in criticism."

If Professor Obler had urged us, simply, to recognize Jung's contributions to what is called myth-criticism; if he had stressed — as an historian can indeed claim — Jung's lifelong effort to celebrate the majesty and pageantry of the arts and the continuity of some forms of human thought, we could scarcely disagree. For it would be folly to deny that myth is composed of what Jung calls archetypal patterns. They're there. And some of our best scholars — Joseph Campbell, most notably — have described them in considerable detail. What Professor Obler wants us to admire is the hypothesis Jung constructs in explanation of why they're there. And it makes no difference, apparently, that the hypothesis itself does not conform to the usual tests for scientific validity — simplicity, frequency of application. It's enough that the idea of a collective unconscious which is immortal — though why this should be the only deathless stuff in all the universe Jung alone knows — it's enough that the idea is beautiful. Jung calls myth the primordial manifestation of the human spirit, of the eternal human soul, and thereby presents in a new jargon the old solace. It's useful to recall how beautiful was Emerson's idea of the Oversoul, how lovely was his notion of Brahma, how splendid was his sense of the poet's role and sanctity, how sweet was his effort to affirm man's importance and deathlessness. For Jung's thought is much like Emerson's in that both systems are platonic. One turns inward to discover there what Emerson and others have long sought elsewhere. And both long for an absolute system of the spirit. "The individual who is not anchored in God," Jung writes in his latest book, The Undiscovered Self, "can offer no resistance on his own resources to the physical and moral blandishments of the world."

The great danger of a statement such as this is that it undermines our capacity to resist the immoral blandishments of an absolute. These invade the intelligence and importune us to misuse our reason, our learning, our energy and our virtue — as too often Professor Obler misuses his. For there is indeed an abuse of history in a paper which reserves for one smallish paragraph and does not proclaim, forcibly, that the best kind of Jungian and psychoanalytic criticism is inexhaustible but cogent, comprehensive yet flexible, eclectic not doctrinaire.

Some of the high points in the discussion from the floor were as follows:

Mr. Lesser took exception to the suggestion that Freud and the Freudians fail to criticize the work; to the confusion which arises when Freud's conception of the creative process is equated with neurosis.

Professor Edel warned that critics, too, must be closely examined lest they embody in an alleged work of criticism nothing more than projections of their own fantasies. The critic who focuses his attention solely on the "words" of the work of art would seem to need some kind of psychoanalytic analysis of his limitations. (And see footnote above.)

The general discussion which followed centered on what is read into a work and what is read out of it.

Pursuant to the invitation to members of the Group who are unable to attend the meeting to submit brief comments in writing, to be read or summarized by the secretary, Dr. John V. Hagopian of the University of Michigan has addressed the following communication to Professor Obler. It could not be read at the meeting because of lack of time, the discussion from the floor having continued for three-quarters of an hour after the meeting was officially declared at an end.

Dear Prof. Obler:

I was delighted with your paper on Psychology and Literary Criticism in the current issue of Lit & Psych .... Since I cannot be in New York to participate in the discussion of your fine paper, I thought I'd . . . tell you how much I appreciated it and . . . present you with one or two critical comments. Though you do a good job in showing the fun-

damental irrelevance of biography to the main goal of literary criticism, it seems to me that you could have done more with the proper relationship between psychology and formalism. It is my contention that with many literary works, especially narrative and dramatic works, the f o r m cannot be perceived without psychological insights into the actions and characters that are formed. Troilus & Criseyde (see my article in Lit & Psych [V, 1, 5-11]), Othello, Crime and Punishment, much of Henry James simply cannot be formally perceived as wholes without the understanding of what's actually going on that (Freudian) psychology gives us. Thus when you say that Troilus can "be explained in terms of courtly love, and Hamlet can be expalined by the Oedipus Complex," you suggest that one set of metaphors is as good as another — or that some works can best be explained by a particular set of metaphors better than by some other. On the contrary, I am certain that the Code of Courtly Love concept blocks our vision of the complete form of Chaucer's novel, just as I think that the Christian tragedy approach blocks our vision of what's actually shaping the action of Othello (a subject which I will discuss at the spring meetings of the Michigan Academy). If a literary work purports to embody and present a virtual (in Suzanne Langer's sense) human experience, and not some abstract commentary or judgment in allegorical dramatization, we absolutely must have psychological insights as our mode of perception . . . .

Time having also prevented Professor Obler from replying to the comments made at the meeting, he has now availed himself of the opportunity to reply as follows:

First, let me thank Leonard Manheim for the opportunity of giving my essay a "trying out" before readers like Profs. Kallich, Wasserstrom, and Hagopian. Some of their comments, together with others received by mail, will help me to rephrase the essay as a proper introduction to our text in Psychology Through Literature. One of the difficulties in writing such an essay is that one is forced to define general trends, cite only representative names, and make provisional suggestions. The complete essays in the body of the text are intended to exemplify and to elaborate the general sketch of the introduction.

Mr. Hagopian's comments invite serious thought. Where he would erect a hierarchy of metaphors or analogies with which to approach all works, I would hold that particular works are most fruitfully opened up by using particular metaphors, and that no one "angle of vision" is inherently more effective than any other. Anyway, why this rather unscientific, u n p r o v i s i o n a l commitment to one set of "truths" by which one hopes to illuminate reality? In critical practice I think that we would all admit that Christian terminology can be helpful in approaching Huck Finn, just as it can block our vision of the novel's total form; similarly with using the Oedipus complex on Hamlet. We frequently are hoist by our own best petards.

To dispose adequately of Mr. Wasserstrom's criticisms would require more space, if less thought. Closer reading on his part would, I am certain, have eliminated certain objections. For instance, p. 51, f. n. 3, clearly says that Jones' Hamlet essay was written in 1910; my few remarks on Burke do not come at the end of the section on Jung, but at the close of a section dealing with The Psychology of the Audience, and so Burke is not treated as a Jungian at all; the quote from Miss Spurgeon on p. 57 implies her awareness — and mine — of the role of the unconscious in shaping one's use of language; unfortunately, since my essay was written before seeing Frye's Anatomy of Criticism, I did not have the opportunity of mistaking its meaning. While it is true that some years have passed since Trilling and Mann wrote their essays, I know of no body of work which invalidates their argument. (Note that William Phillips' admirable anthology on Art and Psychoanalysis includes these essays also.) I think that I am not alone in regarding Freud's attitude toward art as, at the very least, ambivalent. In a lead article in Contemporary Psychology (Jan. 1958), the eminent psychologist Harold McCurdy (whose w o r k, by the way, I d i d slight), holds that in "Freudian theoretical analysis, imagination. . .is regarded as dangerous, as continually menacing the structure of adult personality." Mr. Wasserstrom unaccountably sets up Jung as a straw man. My essay's intention was to see Freud's achievement whole while at the same time suggesting ways by which Jung is useful for poetry and criticism, yet also noting the dangers mythic criticism might involve. (See p. 57, par. 2.) Why Mr. Wasserstrom is bothered that I want to value Jung's hypothesis regardless of its failure to "conform to the usual tests of scientific validity," completely escapes me. Don't we value Freud in the same way? The point is that tremendous insights and imaginative power are available from any body of knowledge — Marxist, Platonist, Rosicrucian, or psychoanalytical. If Mr. Wasserstrom sees a parallel between the concept of the collective unconscious and the Emersonian Oversoul, that would seem to suggest the imaginative grip of the Anima Mundi. — Or are we in the Humanities to resist the appeal of the imaginative, the extra-rational, the poetic?

Respectfully submitted,

Leonard F. Manheim
Secretary

DISARMING AND UNCANNY VISIONS;

FREUD'S "THE UNCANNY" WITH REGARD TO FORM AND CONTENT IN STORIES BY SHERWOOD ANDERSON AND D. H. LAWRENCE

Freudian literary criticism has long suffered from success. The reaction against it finds one form of expression in Stanley Edgar Hyman's The Armed Vision: "The obvious limitation of traditional Freudian literary analysis is that only one study can be written, since every additional one would turn out to say the same thing. Ernest Jones could do a beautiful job of finding the underlying Oedipus complex in Hamlet, but had he gone on to analyze Lear or A Midsummer Night's Dream or the Sonnets he would have found to his surprise that they reflected Shakespeare's Oedipus complex too.... A criticism that can only say...[one thing] turns out not to be saying very much." /1 Jones, of course, was not surprised to find the Oedipus complex in Hamlet, since Freud in The Interpretation of Dreams had already intimated what the fruits of the inquiry would be. But that is neither here nor there; when we descend from Jones on Hamlet to, say, Daniel Schneider on Death of a Salesman we see as Hyman does. With hardly any effort Schneider uncovers an Oedipus complex, which for him provides the explanation for both the play's undoubted success and its supposed greatness. /2 On such a basis Sir Lawrence Olivier's lurid film version of Hamlet is Shakespeare improved, and any popular story that panders to sexual anxieties merits the attention of the ages. One doesn't say very much when one merely points out the Oedipus complex in a work — no more, certainly, than when one merely points out archetypal patterns, myths, organic metaphors, and great themes.

Not that most of us would care to abandon viewpoints that sometimes bring us closer to art than we have been before. To read Jones on Hamlet after reading Goethe, Schlegel, Bradley, and Eliot is to come into light from twilight; here is the objective correlative clearly seen. And not that Hyman is right in assuming that the analysis of Lear must repeat that of Hamlet. Freud himself, if not Jones, proceeds from Hamlet to Lear, Macbeth, and other plays without repeating himself. He does so the easy way, by discussing other psychological matters than the Oedipus complex. But he could have done so the hard way. In his preface to Theodore Reik's Ritual he remarks that "through the elaboration of this complex into the most manifold variants, distortions and disguises, the poet seeks to elucidate his most personal attitude to this effective theme. /3 The Freudian critic is concerned with literary strategies as well as with hidden subject-matter, with form as well as with content. A study of the Oedipus complex in several of Shakespeare's plays need be no more repetitious than a study of the theme of the American in Europe in Henry James' novels.

Freudian literary criticism is inherently rash; it is not inherently simplistic. Up until now it has concerned itself primarily with the unravelling of hidden subjects and meanings, along with the corollary unravelling of motives; its more significant and complex task — as with psychoanalysis itself — is the analysis of strategies, of form. Freud himself in his writings on literature emphasizes matters of content, but he does suggest approaches to the study of form. One of his little-known essays, "The Uncanny," /4 is interesting for the variety of its suggestiveness.

In "Death in the Woods" and "The Rocking-Horse Winner" Sherwood Anderson and D. H. Lawrence have created stories of remarkably delicate power. There is some accounting for this power; it appears to lie in part in an analysis of a quality they share: the evocation of a sense of the uncanny.

"Death in the Woods" is in most respects a clear enough account of an old woman's death, upon which the author imposes a philosophical meaning. The woman had possibly been the child of an illegitimate passion; when she was young she was bound into service; as a young woman she was the helpless victim of sexual approaches by her employer; in marriage she served her husband sexually; throughout her life she fed animals and bought and cooked food for men; now as she dies in the woods with food slung on her back she one last time feeds her dogs. Anderson comments within the story: "The woman who died was one destined to feed animal life.... She was feeding animal life before she was born, as a child, as a young woman working on the farm of the German, after she married, when she grew old and when she died.... A thing so complete has its own beauty."

The problems of the story that present themselves to the reader are few but crucial; they concern both form and content: structure, strategy, intent, and description. First, why does Anderson tell the story in the fashion that he does? Why does he emphasize at the outset that "it is a story," later that he is puzzled by his ability to reconstruct the far past, and towards the end that this "real story" is actually pieced together from miscellaneous unrelated fragments of his own experience? The obvious answer is that all of this is so, and a glance through his Memoirs /5 will confirm the opinion. But such synthesis is the method of most stories, whose art, however, is to conceal what Anderson reveals. Then perhaps the story was carelessly written, or the narrative method was accidentally developed.

1/ New York, 1948, p. 166.

2/ The Psychoanalyst and the Artist (New York, 1950), pp. 346-55.

3/ London, 1931, p. 8. For Freud's discussion of other Shakespearian plays see "Some Character Types Met with in Psychoanalytic Work" and "The Theme of the Three Caskets" in his Collected Papers, IV (London, 1925).

4/ Collected Papers, IV, 368-407.

5/ New York, 1942, pp. 40-44, 310-12.

To the reader who regards the story highly and who knows that this was probably the most carefully written of Anderson's stories, labored over for years and revised several times, such explanations will not suffice.

Secondly, Anderson seems to reject the literary rule that meaning is better implied than baldly stated. In the quoted passage on the beauty of the old woman's life, as well as at several other junctures, he apparently gives away what properly should be hinted at, forces upon the circumstance what should emanate from it. And yet the reader does not feel that Anderson has failed. Why is this so?

There are, additionally, two problems of detail. When the old woman lies freezing to death in the woods, the dogs circling before her, the reader is led to suspect that her end may be gruesome. The dogs have been described as gaunt, starved; they have ranged about the woods chasing rabbits; now they are "excited about something" and seem to Anderson to revive their wolfish ancestry. One by one the dogs come up to the dying woman, look into her face, their red tongues hanging out. But when she is dead, the dogs assault her only for the food on her back; they do not touch her body. The reader perhaps feels misled, if not dissatisfied; he asks with what legitimacy Anderson hints at an attack upon the woman's body which does not occur.

The other problem concerns the physical description of the woman. She is called an "old woman," although she is about forty. (Anderson's remark on her age is ambiguous; it is certain, though, from other evidence that she cannot be more than a year or two above forty.) Anderson explains that she has become bent and sick with her labor and poverty. Then when she lies dead she loses her agedness. Part of her body has been exposed as the dogs have torn at the food on her back, and she seems to the hunter who discovers her "a beautiful young girl" and to the storyteller, who comes upon the scene later, "some charming young girl." If the reader is surprised when after the picture of a truly old woman has been well established he is informed of her comparatively young age, he is nonplussed by her final transfiguration into a lovely young girl — once again after the image of an old woman has re-established itself.

To answer these questions it is necessary first to examine the main image of the story, the dead woman lying in the woods. She lies prone, her body exposed to the waist. Upon the arrival of the townspeople, the storyteller as a young boy among them, she is turned over for identification. The boy, who has never before seen a woman's body, sees "everything" and experiences a "strange mystical feeling," apparently similar to the "uncanny" sensation of the hunter who had first discovered her. Of course the boy does not see "everything"; he sees only the woman's breasts, which are never mentioned. One thinks then of the meaning of the story given by Anderson: this is the woman who all her life has fed men. Yet Andreson has again left unmentioned, has nowhere overtly suggested, the basic manner in which this woman — all women, for he generalizes — feeds man: at her breast. But if one reflects upon the woman's nakedness in the woods, it is possible to infer that the entire scene covertly concerns breast-feeding and hence that the main image of the story concerns the point that Anderson has apparently ignored — his art being to conceal. The inference requires some hazardous leaps: the reader has suspected that the dogs will attack the woman's body for food — as once the storyteller or reader took his mother's breast to his mouth for food; but the dogs leave the woman's body unharmed — as the storyteller or reader so left his mother's breast; all that the dogs want is the food on her back — as the storyteller or reader wanted only the food on her front. Perhaps these suggestions are extravagant. Then consider that the old woman who feeds the dogs is a young-old woman; and the woman who feeds her child is a young, "beautiful," "charming" woman, whose act the child consciously forgets and who is old, sexless when the child as an adolescent re-discovers the female breasts as sexual objects. The storyteller tells a lie (Anderson would say that lying is his function); he has once before seen a woman so exposed.

The two problems of detail are perhaps tentatively cleared up. The intent and actions of the dogs symbolize the intent and actions of the infant, and the young-old woman is compounded of the nursing mother who is remembered unconsciously and the graying mother known consciously. Anderson's main strategy seems to appear: he is telling not a story that is easy to understand, with a meaning flatly stated at the end, but a story that he may not comprehend and whose paramount meaning he can only suggest. His final words are, "I have been impelled to try [emphasis added] to tell the simple story over again." And his narrative form may seem a deliberate means of conveying to the reader the sense of mystery, of meaning for which there are only scattered clues, of something profound and general implied by some isolated occurrences, of a memory "like music heard from far off" that reverberates in recesses of the mind. Or the form may be an unconscious acknowledgement of the intractability of his material. Or it is both.

The powerful element of the uncanny remains unexplored. It is unlikely that the reader has much if any sense of the uncanny in the woods scene, but the term uncanny is used twice in its presentation and to good purpose. The first time it is employed to suggest the hunter's emotion upon finding the body; his emotion links to the storyteller's feelings upon seeing the woman. Secondly, the word appears in the storyteller's reference to an occurrence in his young manhood, when he had an experience with dogs similar to the old woman's. The uncanny points to two things then: the uncovering of the female body: specifically the breasts, and the attack of dogs. Here Freud's essay becomes useful. In it he offers the following psychological stages for sensing the uncanny. (1) Any emotion, whatever its quality, is transformed by repression into morbid anxiety. (2) Any new situation that recalls an old one whose emotion (affect) is repressed will arouse anxiety. (3) This anxiety will have the quality of uncanniness (etymologically "the unknown," psychoanalytically the unknown—known — that is, repressed from conscious knowledge) when either (a) infantile complexes, such as cas-

tration, Oedipus, and womb fantasies, are revived, or (b) ontogenetically primitive beliefs, such as animism, magic, and omnipotence of thought seem once more to be confirmed. Freud's analysis, joined with our interpretation of the story, explains the evocation of the sense of the uncanny. The infantile complex central to the story is a breast fantasy; the storyteller as he sees a naked woman supposedly for the first time recalls, on a pre-conscious level, the repressed infantile relationship to the mother in its complex of hunger, oral eroticism, and oral aggression; he senses the uncanny.

The uncanniness of the dogs attacking the woman's body repeats the uncanniness of the exposure of the breasts; the uncanniness of their attack may carry additionally the overtone of the repressed genital desires of the child — "repressed" here by the dogs, which, like the child, take only food. The new implication is supported by the uncanniness of the storyteller's experience as a young man, when the dogs attack him. The attack here would be castrative, and the uncanniness would be the recollection of the infantile fear — the recollection coming at a time when the revival of sexual activity after latency revives the threat that accompanies infantile sexual desires.

Since a threat of castration is primarily a threat by the father and since the attack upon the woman suggests more than a child's desire ("The dog thrust his face close to her face. His red tongue was hanging out"), an adult male is of some importance to the atmosphere of the story. /6 He is the sexual partner of the mother who feeds men: he is, presumably, both the German employer and Jake Grimes, the old woman's husband. The dual image can perhaps be referred to broad aspects of father-son relationships. The German's brutal aggressiveness reflects a child's characteristic envy or awe of the father's sexual prowess and a child's common delusion of his mother's victimization. Jake Grimes, on the other hand, although like the German a man to fear, a drunkard, a horse thief, a man who contains violence, displays in the story no obvious sexual lust for the old woman; Anderson mentions that later in life the old woman did not feed him "in a certain way." Grimes perhaps represents the father who threatens not the mother but the child, he who punishes the child's sexual activity by castration.

If the reader himself has any sense of the uncanny while reading the story, it is not at either the point when the woman's body is turned over or the reminiscence of the storyteller's experience of young manhood; it occurs in one or two descriptive passages, the first of the cold, bare, and silent woodlands, the woman dozing and the dogs circling, and the second of the same scene after the hunter has found the body. Two questions arise: what is the source of uncanniness here, and why should the sensation at one juncture belong only to the storyteller and at another to — presumably — both storyteller and reader? Freud in his article has an answer to the first. Having noted that silence, solitude, and darkness are frequent scenic components of uncanny situations, he suggests their appropriateness through being "elements in the production of that infantile morbid anxiety from which the majority of human beings have never become quite free." /7 Along with coldness and snow, silence, solitude, and darkness constitute Anderson's scenes; They revivify the actual uncanny situations that the other elements of the story call to mind.

The other question has two answers. First of all, Anderson slights description, emotion, and atmosphere at the points of exposure of the woman's body and his young manhood experience, whereas he more carefully builds and sustains the scenes that do evoke uncanniness. Secondly, the exposure and young manhood scenes are experiences of the storyteller, whose personal role is insignificant and from whom the reader stands apart; contrastingly, the uncanny scenes are clearly intended for the reader's mind and imagination. In his article, Freud offers several illustrations of comparable restrictions upon the evocation of the uncanny.

D. H. Lawrence's story is a knottier problem than Anderson's. A favorite of the anthologists (it was first published in an anthology of stories of the uncanny), it has nevertheless received little scrutiny and has resisted scrutiny well; it seems especially designed to teach humility to critics. Harry T. Moore in his Life and Works of D. H. Lawrence acknowledges that the power of the story cannot be adequately explained in terms of its depiction of the "money neurosis" of modern society, but he is unable to get behind its "contagious excitement," "inescapable doom," and "horror." /8 Robert Gorham Davis invokes myth and lore: " 'The Rocking-Horse Winner' is a parable on the money lusts of modern society, but it draws its magic from very ancient sources. Hobbyhorses are very common in folklore, and there are accounts of rituals in which their riders rocked themselves into a trance in order to attain powers of prophecy." /9 Davis doesn't explain where the ancient source gets its magic and power and by what apparatus Lawrence's story draws upon the past. Even less helpfully Caroline Gordon and Allen Tate in The House of Fiction affirm that Paul "has invoked strange gods"; he is "in the grip of a supernatural power." /10 From the psychoanalytic viewpoint the story has been analyzed as a childhood problem of homosexuality and masturbation, but the interpretation seems decidedly less meaningful than an analysis of overt themes. The most recent approach to the story, by W. D. Snodgrass, attempts a synthesis of several viewpoints; it establishes — in some respects quite successfully — an interrelationship among the themes of money, masturbation, and adult love; but in the process the story gets lost: Paul emerges at one point as "a symbol of civilized man. . ., the s c i e n t i s t, teacher, theorist, who must always know about

6/ Irving Howe remarks, "The old woman seems an image of the overwhelmed feminine victim, for even the dogs that attend her are male." Sherwood Anderson (New York, 1951), p. 166.

7/ P. 407.

8/ New York, 1951, pp. 278-79.

9/ In his anthology Ten Modern Masters (New York, 1953), p. 388.

10/ New York, 1950, p. 351.

the outside world so that he can manipulate it...." /11

The story defies sufficient explication. However, insofar as its power is related to the sense of the uncanny that Lawrence evokes, it can be approached in terms of Freud's analysis: (1) The uncanny as, in part, the unknown-known is intimated in several ways in the story. There are the open secrets of the household, not spoken but read in the eyes: that at the core of the mother's heart there is no love; that the family needs money. There are the personal knowledge, feeling, and action kept from others: that Paul bets and rides his horse to win; something that his mother withholds when Paul asks her why she is unlucky. More importantly, there are the mysterious cognitions: Paul's power of prophecy, when he "knows"; his mother's divination as she comes into his room at the end. All of this suggests elements of, or the atmosphere of, uncanny situations. (2) The uncanny, in one of its two aspects ("Death in the Woods" illustrates the other), takes us back to primitive ways of thinking. "The Rocking-Horse Winner" offers three important categories: (a) animism — the rocking-horse as a real horse, (b) omnipotence of thought — predicting the winners, (c) fatalism — lucky and unlucky persons. (3) The sense of the uncanny does not arise automatically from primitive thinking. The frank abandonment of reality in the fairy tale and the frank indulgence in childish ways of thought will not produce a sense of the uncanny. For although the fairy tale may recall infantile ways of thought, it does not seem to confirm those ways of thought. Uncanniness arises only when "the writer pretends to move in the world of common reality ..., takes advantage, as it were, of our supposedly surmounted superstitiousness..., deceives us into thinking that he is giving us the sober truth, and then after all oversteps the bounds of possibility." /12 Lawrence's story meets Freud's conditions, although it achieves a more delicate balance than Freud envisions. For it possesses very nearly the quality of the fairy tale: "There was a woman who was beautiful, who started with all the advantages, yet she had no luck." This quality — if one accepts Freud's conditions — constantly threatens failure in the evocation of the uncanny; it constantly weighs against the realism of the story. Perhaps Lawrence's major triumph in the story is that he achieves uncanniness at such a risk.

Perhaps. But one thinks that the fairy-tale quality of the story has its own virtues; it is the basis of the story's beautiful economy. Single explanations will not suffice. The Freudian critic may feel entitled to change "draws its magic from very ancient sources" to "draws its magic — under restricted conditions — from childhood sources," but he has not thereby explained "The Rocking-Horse Winner." He might go further by examining the style and tone of some other Lawrence stories for their fairy-tale qualities and asking himself how they serve as literary strategies. Here would be a problem to sink his teeth into. The consequence might be an armed vision.

James G. Hepburn
Dept. of English
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York

11/"A Rocking-Horse: The Symbol, the Pattern, the Way to Live," Hudson Review, XI, (1958), 191-200.

12/Freud, p. 405.

BOOK REVIEWS

Angel Flores and Homer Swander, editors — Franz Kafka Today. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958. Pp. 290. $5.00.

CONTENTS: Introduction by the editors. Part I: Papers on eight short stories; by Kate Flores, F. D. Luke, Basil Busacca, Wm. C. Rubinstein, R. W. Stallman, Carl R. Woodring, Clement Greenberg, and Jarvis Thurston. Part II: Papers on the novels: two on Amerika, by Mark Spilka and Lienhard Bergel; two on The Trial, by Herman Uyttersprot and René Dauvin; three on The Castle, by Max Brod, Donald Pearce, and Homer Swander. Part III: Papers on the diaries and letters; by Maurice Blanchot (diaries), Heinz Politzer (Letter to his father), Werner Vortriede (Letters to Milena). Part IV: Bibliographical index of the works available in English, bibliography of biography and criticism, index.

The eighteen contributions to this volume, edited by two and translated, whenever necessary, by three scholars, make up a complex tribute to the ever-fascinating genius of Franz Kafka. K. Flores examines "The Judgment" in terms of the Oedipus approach, F. D. Luke analyzes "The Metamorphosis" along more literary lines and with an interesting sidelight on Th. Mann. By means of analytical logic B. Busacca penetrates "A Country Doctor"; this is certainly one of the most stimulating articles, using, in the end, four different approaches to determine the "meaning" of the story. The problem of European Jewry is placed at the center of W. Rubinstein's explorations of "A Report to an Academy" and C. Greenberg's interpretation of "At the Building of the Great Wall of China." "Josephine is Josephine," says C. Woodring on the story of the same name; here interpretation becomes Kafkaesque. J. Thurston looks at "The Married Couple" from the point of view of religion. Then the great novels are taken up as to genesis, structure, and meaning; the most fruitful study seems to be H. Uyttersprot's rearrangement of the chapters of "The Trial" — a truly remarkable and eye-opening account and valid criticism of Brod's questionable edition. Lastly, diaries and letters are considered and bibliographical aids given.

What emerges most clearly from the predominantly psychological, or psychoanalytical, contributions (with the religious approach, it seems, a close second) is: (1) No start-

ling new Kafka-interpretation is given. (2) There are so many layers of meaning in Kafka's works, layers of meaning which are interpenetrating rather than separated from one another, that it is impossible to do justice to the writer by analyzing him in only one particular way. But since it is equally impossible to analyze him in every conceivable way (unless one wants to rewrite the story, or novel, respectively, is it not best not to analyze him at all? Kafka is a border-line case in literary criticism; as the essay by Busacca suggests, given a certain "relationship" (to this or that reality), "there is no problem in providing t e r m i n i." In other words: Kafka can be interpreted "correctly" from any point of view if one sees him in a certain relationship to a certain form of reality. But, as Busacca continues, "what is ridiculous is the insistence of each explicator that the others are wrong. Not every contributor in this collection insists that he is right; but the underlying understanding is that, taken all in all, there is no other way to interpret Kafka than the one offered. (3) Before interpretations can be made, the example of Uyttersprot's is to be followed in attempting to re-establish the original Kafka. As long as the manuscripts are hardly accessible, however, even attempts are impossible. (4) A rest in Kafka-research ought to be prescribed, then.

The book under review has no obvious shortcomings other than those implied in our summary above. Only it cannot be read as a book. If one tries to read it as such (as the reviewer has to), one gets hopelessly clogged up with all the interpretations offered; and the jargon — in such obvious contrast to the clear language of the original — is stifling. Rather, this book should be consulted from time to time as the reader of Kafka has this or that story before him. Since this seems to be the book's purpose, it can receive full justice only from the reader of an individual Kafka-work, not from a book-reviewer.

Joachim Seyppel
Dept. of German
Bryn Mawr College
Bryn Mawr, Penna.

Frederick J. Hoffman — Freudianism and the Literary Mind (Second edition, revised. Original edition: 1945, by the same publisher). Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1957. Pp. x+350 (including selected bibliography and index). $5.00

Leon Edel — The Modern Psychological Novel (Originally published under the title The Psychological Novel 1900-1950 by Lippincott, New York, 1955). New York: Grove Press., Inc., 1959. Pp. 143 + 3 index-pages (not numbered). Cloth-bound, $3.50; paper-back (Evergreen Book E-134), $1.45.

It has become an obvious truism in these pages that psycho-literary criticism by American scholars (qua criticism, that is, as opposed to collected clinical data) is a comparatively new academic discipline. Except for a few outstanding exceptions, the major works in the field do not antedate by many years the foundation of this journal and of the Conference and Discussion Group which sponsors it. Evidence of its increasing importance, however, is the increasing number of new (sometimes revised) editions of the important and seminal works in the field, in clothbound and, what is more important from an economic viewpoint, paper-back editions. Three of these were the subject of comment in our Summer 1958 issue (VIII, 3, 44-46). Here we have two more to be added to the "must" list of those newly interested and those who qualify as members of the Old Guard, alike.

Within its own self-imposed limitations, Professor Hoffman's work has been recognized as definitive ever since its original publication. These limitations included (1) a summary and evaluation of Freudian psychoanalysis as it affected literary production during the first third of the twentieth century. Mr. Hoffman is careful to make it plain — although some of his readers have not always kept the distinction clearly in mind — that his work relates to modern literature, rather than to literary criticism; (2) deliberate focusing of the "survey of Freudian influence on the American and British scene." The latter limitation has been lifted to the extent of following the advice of Ernst Kris that "a number of Continental authors. . .might well have been included." The result is a chapter on Mann and Kafka which is as profound and informative as were the original excellent chapters on Joyce and D. H. Lawrence. Mr. Hoffman has followed another recent trend by including a new study of Fitzgerald's Tender Is the Night. In the study of Mann, Mr. Hoffman has rather regrettably limited himself to the works terminating with the Joseph cycle. It might have been most interesting to see how the theory of influence might have been applied to Doctor Faustus, The Holy Sinner (Der Erwählte), and, most interetsing of all, The Black Swan (Die Betrogene). /1

With the Hoffman work again available, including its copious and scholarly footnotes, its re-publication in an Appendix of the English Institute essay on "Psychology and Literature" (originally published in Lit. & Psy. [VI, 4, 111-115]), and its generous though selected bibliography, this journal may well call a halt to the duplication of early material in its running bibliographies.

Your Editor is aware that Professor Edel was never quite satisfied with the title of his work as originally published. The present revised title will, we fear, turn out to be equally unsatisfactory. The work is really concerned in no sense with the "psychological novel" as that term is understood in relation to the works of, say, George Eliot or Flaubert. Mr. Edel clarifies his intent in the initial words of his Foreword:

1/ See Professor Mertens' article, which deals in part with the last-named novel, in L&P, VI, 3, 96-99.

> In this essay I have sought to define what seems to me the most characteristic aspect of twentieth-century fiction: its inward-turning to convey the flow of mental experience, what is loosely called the "stream of consciousness." Actually this essay embraces much more: it is concerned with the manner in which emotional and sensory experience has been rendered in fiction, the bold attempt of certain novelists to make words evoke image, sensation, mental atmosphere — the large effort of certain modern novelists to write symbolist fiction.

The writers stressed by Mr. Edel are Henry James (quite naturally), Proust, Joyce, Dorothy Richardson, Virginia Woolf, and Faulkner. In a sense this work furnishes both contrast and supplement to Mr. Hoffman's. Mr. Edel is more interested in the "strategy" and aesthetics of serious prose fiction than in influences, and he is much more at home in the field of comparative literature (particularly the French) than is Mr. Hoffman.

Although the present edition (only four years after the original) is a reprint rather than a revision, the work, according to the author's own avowal, had its origins as long ago as 1928. Here too, therefore, we have a book which is the product of mature scholarship, beautifully and economically written, a work which is already on its way to becoming a classic in its field.

A final note of advice and suggestion to publishers. Is it not time that a new (possibly revised) edition of Roy Basler's Sex, Symbolism and Psychology in Literature (originally published in 1948 and now out of print) was published?

L. F. M.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

Your Editors are grateful to the publishers and authors who send us newly published books and reprints for review. Since it becomes increasingly difficult, however, to accommodate in these limited pages all (or even most) of the material which should appear, we are compelled to adopt a policy of listing books received only when they seem to have some relevance to both of the disciplines which constitute the subject-matter of this journal. As always, brief comment here does not preclude fuller review in a later issue. Readers who would be interested in writing such reviews are requested to communicate with the Editors as promptly as possible.

Alfred Adler — What Life Should Mean to You (edited by Alan Porter). New York: Capricorn Books, 1959. Pp. 300 (including index). Paperback, $1.25.

[One of a new series of paperbacks being published by Putnam under the general editorship of Edmund L. Epstein. There is no indication of the precise functions of the editors named, and there is no statement as to whether the work is a translation. The book is a basic statement of Adlerian psychology which is comparable in its own way to Freud's Outline (Abriss) of Psychoanalysis.]

Clive Bell — Art. New York: Capricorn Books, 1959. (Original editions 1913 and 1948.) Pp. 190 (no index). Paperback, $1.15

[It is interesting to compare Bell's theory of aesthetics with Dewey's and Whitehead's (see infra).]

Henri Bergson — The World of Dreams (tr. by Wade Baskin, who has also written a 14-page introduction). New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. Pp. 58 (no index). $2.75.

[Perhaps it is useful to reprint a minor work "first given as a lecture before the Institut Psychologique . . . and later published in the Revue Scientifique of June 8, 1901." Perhaps it is also true, as the editor-translator contends, that "apart from the contributions of groups associated with Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler, and C. G. Jung, there has been little progress since Bergson at the end of his enlightening study left us 'at the threshold of the mystery'." (The exception seems rather large.) Your Editors feel, however, that they would be justified hereafter in ignoring books such as this one, consisting of 14 pages of introduction, 38 pages of text, without notes or index, and offered for sale at the outrageous price of $2.75.]

Sidney D. Braun, editor — Dictionary of French Literature. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. Pp. xv + 362 + 18 plates (illustrations). $10.00.

John Dewey — Art As Experience. New York: Capricorn Books, 1959. Pp. viii + 355. Paperback, $1.35.

[The 1931 William James Lectures at Harvard once again reprinted in convenient form. The author's preface acknowledges indebtedness for permission to reprint a number of illustrations. There are no illustrations in this edition.]

Doris V. Falk — Eugene O'Neill and the Tragic Tension. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1958. $4.50.

[This study will be fully reviewed in a forthcoming issue.]

Frederick L. Gwynn and Joseph L. Blotner — The Fiction of J. D. Salinger. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958. Pp. viii + 59 (including a bibliography containing checklists of Salinger's published fiction and of critical studies thereof). Paperback, $1.50.

[This invaluable little study would repay the effort of a full-scale review. Salinger's works seem to bear out your Editor's theory of the relation of art and neurosis; viz., that art may be produced by drives that might otherwise result in neurosis, but that neurosis itself does not produce art.]

Henry James — The Golden Bowl. New York: Grove Press, 1959. (First published in 1905.)

Pp. 548. Clothbound, $6.50; paperback (Evergreen Book E-131), $1.95.

[A reprint of the text without introduction or other critical paraphernalia.]

Samuel Reiss — Language and Psychology. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Pp. 299 + 3-page (unnumbered) preface. (A very sketchy subject-index.) $3.75.

[One of several books by the same author, all dealing with aspects of linguistics, logic, and psychology. Is there a reader who would care to review this work?]

Rainer Maria Rilke — The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge (tr. with a foreword and notes by M. D. Herter Norton). New York: Capricorn Books, 1959. (This translation was originally published by Norton, New York, in 1949.) Pp. 237. $1.15.

[Some day someone is going to make a study of the relation between the Brigge-projection and the psychodynamic pattern of Rilke.]

John S. White — Renaissance Cavalier. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Pp. 66 (including bibliography) + frontispiece. $3.50

[A monograph based on a contrast between Castiglione's Book of the Courtier and The Prince of Machiavelli, "based on Spranger's typology." Once again, the list price is exorbitant.]

Alfred North Whitehead — Modes of Thought. New York: Capricorn Books, 1959. Pp. viii + 241 (including index). Paperback, $1.15.

[Six chapters based on lectures at Wellesley College during 1937–1938; two, delivered four years earlier at the University of Chicago; the epilogue, delivered at Harvard in 1935. The epilogue concludes: "Philosophy is akin to poetry, and both of them seek to express that ultimate good sense which we term civilization. In each case there is reference to form beyond the direct meanings of words. Poetry allies itself to metre, philosophy to mathematic pattern."]

BIBLIOGRAPHY (XXXII)

** Once again we report by experience and hearsay the papers at MLA which might have been of interest to our readers. Once again the sign + indicates hearsay only.

"The Autobiographical Matrix of Great Expectations," by Ada Nisbet (Victorian Lit.)

"The Hero–Villain of Oliver Twist," by Jonathan Bishop (Victorian Lit.)

"Joyce and the Early Thomas Mann," by J. Mitchell Morse (Comp. Lit. 6)

+ "Thanatos and Eros: Approaches to Dostoevsky's Universe," by Ralph E. Matlaw (Prose Fiction)

+ "Death in the Late Works of Thomas Mann," by Henry Hatfield (Prose Fiction)

"Rousseau and Romantic Psychology," by Mark L. Temmer (18th Century French Lit.)

"Satan and Science" by Kester Svendsen (Literature and Science)

+ "The Development of the Concept of Symbolism in German Romanticism," by Liselotte Dieckmann (Germanic Section)

+ "Selbstopfer des Geistes. Die Erlösungsmission des Künstlers in Hoffmansthals Der Turm und Thomas Manns Doktor Faustus," by William H. Rey (Germanic Section)

"An Examination of the Myth and Ritual Approach to Shakespeare," by Herbert Weisinger (Shakespeare)

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Offprints Received

From Dr. Roy Basler:

&-John Crowe Ransom, Delmore Schwartz, and John Hall Wheelock; "American Poetry at Mid-Century," Whittall Poetry and Literature Lectures for 1958. Reference Dept. of the Library of Congress.

From Professor Prescott:

&-Joseph Prescott, "Seven Letters from Dorothy M. Richardson," Yale Univ. Library Gazette, 33 3 (Jan 59), 102-111.

There is an editorial note added at p. 111 to the effect that the "Dorothy Richardson Collection. . .established recently in the Library . . . is [at present] reserved for use by Miss Richardson's authorized biographer, Professor Leon Edel, but it will eventually be available to qualified scholars."

From the author (academic affiliation given in MLA directory as "Brown U, Grad School"):

%-Louis H. Leiter, "A Problem in Analysis: Franz Kafka's 'A Country Doctor'," JAAC, XVI, 3 (Mar 58), 337-47.

The author refers to two other essays on the same story:

%-Richard H. Lawson, "Kafka's 'Der Landarzt'," Monatshefte, XLIX (Oct 57), 265-271 [said to interpret the story "on at least two levels, biographical and/or Freudian"]

and

%-Stanley Cooperman, "Kafka's 'A Country Doctor'," UKCRev, XXIV (Oct 57), 75-80.

As to the latter, compare Mr. Leiter's description of the viewpoint as "both . . . psychoanalytical and existential" with our comments in VII, 4, 60. See also the book-review of the Kafka studies, pp. 12-13, supra.

From Professor Wyatt:

*-Frederick Wyatt & William B. Willcox, "Sir Henry Clinton: A Psychological Exploration in History," Wm & Mary Qrtrly, XVI, 1 (Jan 59), 3-26.

This collaboration between a clinical psychologist and a historian is labelled "a progress report" growing out of "a larger interdisciplinary study conducted. . .under a grant from the Ford Foundation." A footnote at pp. 12-13 cites as a previous attempt at such interdisciplinary collaboration the Wyatt, Bacon, and Eastman article-review in L&P, VI, 1, 18–27. An interesting aspect of the present study is the verbatim report, at pp. 16-17, of a sample colloquy between the two authors.